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that puts distance between realist, cognitive metaethical theories and nonrealist,
noncognitive, or emotivist theories. If you think that moral judgment is largely
based on inputs with propositional content that don’t involve emotion, the view
that moral judgments are straightforwardly cognitive attitudes that have propositions as their objects is easier to defend. However, if emotions are a central part
of how we come to have evidence for a moral proposition and our moral judgments can be based on these emotions that are caused by our perception, then
there is some room to ask: Why shouldn’t we simply think that our moral judgments just are some kind of expression of those emotions? So bringing emotions
into the theory of moral perception might yield interesting ways to defend moral
realism from challenges, but it also introduces avenues for antirealist challenges.
There is one final worry about bringing emotions into a theory of moral
perception that might be best drawn out with an analogy to nonmoral perception. Suppose we were beings with a slightly different nonmoral perceptual apparatus. Suppose phenomenal qualia that we typically experience when we observe objects also showed up in our cognitive life when we weren’t experiencing
the presence of an object. Basically, we would periodically have apparent perceptions of objects when there were no objects. Furthermore, suppose we could
know that this was sometimes the case. I suspect we would feel rational pressure to
be a bit more skeptical about our nonmoral judgments based on perception.
One might argue that we’re kind of in that situation if our moral perception apparatus includes an emotional component. We often experience emotions when there is nothing moral about the situation we’re in, and so by analogy
to the perception case, we might think that we should be a bit more skeptical
about moral judgments. A possible virtue of a moral perception view that didn’t
make emotions a component of the view might not have to address this worry,
but if emotions are indeed an important part of Audi’s moral perception theory,
then it is worth asking why we shouldn’t take ourselves to have some defeaters
for moral beliefs.
CONCLUSION
This book is a clear defense of a novel view in moral perception. It’s well worth
the read for anyone working on moral perception. It raises new and interesting
puzzles for the moral perception view and will likely be an important thread in
many new and interesting developments on the question whether moral perception is possible.
Andrew Cullison
State University of New York at Fredonia

Broome, John. Rationality through Reasoning.
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. Pp. 322. $99.95 ðclothÞ.
The official topic of John Broome’s Rationality through Reasoning is the “motivation question”: How does the belief that you ought to do something cause you
to intend to do that thing? And indeed, the parts of the book do combine to offer
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an answer to that question. But, as Broome himself suggests, much of the interest comes from the steps along the way. The book greatly expands and develops
Broome’s earlier work, drawing rich connections throughout ðaddressing how
ought figures in requirements of rationality, how reasons may be defined in terms
of ought, whether there is reason to be rational, how rationality is connected to
the process of reasoning, etc.Þ. This review considers Broome’s account of four
main concepts in turn: ought, reasons, rationality, and reasoning.
OUGHT
Broome aims to identify and characterize what he calls “the central ought.” This
is the ought that many would refer to as normative, or as the one connected to
reasons. While some would try to analyze the central ought in those terms, for
Broome, it is the central ought that is conceptually basic. Accordingly, he offers
no definition of it but rather elucidates some of its features.
First, central oughts are owned by agents. In “Alison ought to get a sun hat,”
Alison would normally be the owner of the ought, in the sense that it is required
of her that she get a sun hat. The owner of an ought need not always be found in
the subject position: if Alison is a child, it might be that her parents own this
ought, in that it is required of them that she get a sun hat. Second, central oughts
relate their owner N to a proposition p, rather than to an action or property: they
ascribe a kind of responsibility to N for its being the case that p. Third, and most
important to singling out the central ought, it figures in the principle of Enkrasia, which holds roughly that “rationality requires of you that, if you believe
that you yourself ought that you F, you intend that you F” ð23Þ.
This third feature is used to argue that the central ought is not an objective
ought, where what one ought to do can depend on all manner of unknowable facts,
but rather a prospective ought, where what one ought to do depends on one’s evidence and perhaps one’s beliefs. Broome considers cases along the following
lines: at a casino, you may bet all your money on any given number on a roulette
wheel, or you may refrain from betting. You know that, objectively, refraining
from betting would be suboptimal ðsince it would be better to bet on the winning
numberÞ. So you know that you objectively ought not refrain from betting and
hence that you objectively ought to bet. But you may, without irrationality, hold
this belief that you objectively ought to bet and yet not intend to bet. Thus, Broome
concludes, the objective ought does not figure in Enkrasia and so cannot be the
central ought.
This type of argument, however, appears to work against almost any candidate for the central ought, including Broome’s prospective ought, at least given
his other views. Broome holds that one may be rationally uncertain about what
one ought, in the central sense, to do ðe.g., because one is rationally uncertain
what moral theory is trueÞ. In such cases, he holds that one may rationally take
account of how bad each option is if it is in fact not what one ought to do. Thus he
holds one may rationally intend a safe option F which, while it is probably not
what one ought to do, is safer than ∼F in that ∼F might be very wrong. So consider a
case with three options where one can either ðiÞ keep one’s promise to A, ðiiÞ keep
one’s promise to B, or ðiiiÞ keep one’s promises to both. One is rationally uncertain what moral theory is true, in that one is uncertain just what conditions
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make a promise binding ðe.g., what conditions would make a promise coerced,
and so not bindingÞ. In this case, suppose one has gotten far enough to know that
exactly one of the two promises is binding, but does not know which and regards
each as equally likely to be binding. One is certain that one ought not do ðiiiÞ, since,
while one ought to keep the binding promise ðwhichever it may beÞ, there is no
reason to keep the other, and it would be slightly inconvenient to do so. So one
is certain one ought to keep exactly one promise. Nevertheless, one might rationally intend ðiiiÞ on the grounds that it is a “safe option” which avoids the risk of
doing something very wrong ðnamely, failing to keep the binding promiseÞ. Here,
one can be perfectly rational while believing one ought to keep exactly one
promise but not intending to do so. Thus, given Broome’s views, it may be that the
central ought does not in fact satisfy Enkrasia.
REASONS
Although Broome does not define the central ought ðhereafter simply “ought”Þ,
he does define normative reasons in terms of it along with nonnormative concepts of explanation. In particular, he defines two kinds of normative reasons.
First, “a pro toto reason for N to F is an explanation of why N ought to F.” A
pro toto reason “need not be full or complete,” and what counts as one “may depend
on the context” ð50Þ. Thus, Broome notes that the fact that Mr. Reed is the best
dentist around can constitute a pro toto reason for you to visit Mr. Reed. Broome’s
example works since in the right context ðe.g., one in which it is understood that
you need and can afford a good dentistÞ, this fact alone would constitute an acceptable answer to “Why is it true that I ought to visit Mr. Reed?”
Second, “a pro tanto reason for N to F is something that plays the for-F role in
a weighing explanation” of ðiÞ why N ought to F, ðiiÞ why N ought not to F, or
ðiiiÞ why neither is true ð53Þ. Again, what counts as a pro tanto reason depends on
context, including background information. Crucially for Broome’s definition,
the concepts it invokes, including the concept of the “for-F” role, must be nonnormative. Thus, we cannot rely on a prior understanding of playing the for-F role
as counting in favor of F in some normative way. Accordingly, Broome appeals to
a general, nonnormative concept of a weighing explanation that covers mechanical cases ðsuch as explaining why a balance tips to the leftÞ and normative ones:
various factors have weights, these weights combine ðalthough perhaps not by
simple additionÞ, and one side wins. For the case of reasons, when there is a
weighing explanation of why you ought to F, the factors that play the for-F role
are simply those on the winning side.
Granting Broome that he relies only on nonnormative concepts of explanation, it is not clear how well his defined concepts match up with the intuitive
notion of a reason. To take one of Broome’s examples, suppose you promised
your friend you would F ðsome onerous taskÞ, but your friend has released you
from your promise. Accordingly, you ought not F. Broome holds that the fact that
your friend released you plays a canceling role in the explanation of why you
ought not F but that it is not itself a reason not to F ð62Þ. However, the contextual
flexibility of his view seems to undermine this verdict. In the right context ðe.g.,
one where it is understood that F is onerous and you ought not do it unless you
are bound toÞ, if you were to ask “Why is it true that I ought not F?” it would be
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sufficient to answer this question by reminding you, “Your friend released you
from your promise.” We would then have to count the fact that your friend released you from your promise as a pro toto reason for you not to F, contrary to
Broome’s intuition about the case. The same issue arises for enabling conditions,
since these can be cited as explanations of ought facts, even when they intuitively
do not normatively favor the action they enable.
RATIONALITY
Broome takes rationality to be, like prudence, morality, or the law, a source of
requirements or prescriptions. In itself, this does not tell us much about rationality: ðiÞ Broome offers no general characterization of “what sort of thing” a
source of requirements is ð116Þ, ðiiÞ the requirements issued by a source need not
obey most principles of deontic logic ðe.g., the law might require both p and ∼pÞ,
and ðiiiÞ requirements can exist without there being any normative reason to
comply with them. Broome does endorse a few general features of requirements
of rationality. First, the fact that rationality requires something of you is necessarily a reason to do it, but Broome is explicit that he has “no argument” in support of this ð193Þ. Second, requirements of rationality supervene on the mind;
hence, while they may involve your intending an external action, they do not involve your actually performing it. Finally, rationality does not require you to hold
or not hold a given attitude ðwith the exception of a requirement not to believe
the conjunction p & ∼pÞ. Instead, the requirements of rationality involve multiple attitudes, just as Enkrasia rules out the combination of a normative belief
and the lack of a corresponding intention. Requirements of rationality thus take
a wide scope ðover some compound of multiple attitudesÞ, rather than a narrow
scope ðover a single attitude or lack of attitudeÞ.
Broome works out in detail the content of a variety of requirements of rationality: apart from Enkrasia, there are requirements of noncontradiction in
belief or intention, means-end coherence, persistence of belief and intention
over time, requirements that one’s beliefs not be incomplete in certain ways, and
prohibitions and permissions governing which attitudes may stand in the basing
relation to each other. He appeals to intuition, rather than to a “general method”
to identify these ð150Þ. This will be a stumbling block for readers who do not have
quite so clear a grip on the concept of rationality that is being invoked. While we
can narrow things down with some paradigm cases ðe.g., typical cases of contradictory beliefs are irrationalÞ, it is not so clear what is at issue in drawing the
boundaries of rationality. Here are two features of Broome’s requirements that
raise the question of the significance of the boundaries. First, Broome’s requirements treat idealization unevenly. Broome aims to describe what it is to be “fully
rational” or “rational to the highest degree” ð71Þ. Accordingly, he accepts synchronic requirements, even though they require an instantaneous and so perhaps impossible response to a learning experience; he also accepts a requirement not to both believe p and believe ∼p, even though it would be impossible
or pointless for us to search out and eliminate all such pairs. On the other side,
though, he allows larger sets of inconsistent beliefs to count as fully rational,
despite holding that an ideal agent would have no such inconsistencies. Second,
his requirements treat epistemic and practical rationality unevenly. The epistemic

1198

Ethics

July 2015

requirements ultimately build in substantive norms of good epistemic reasoning,
such as “inductive inference” and “inference to the best explanation” ð191Þ. Yet
the practical requirements appear not to build in substantive norms of good practical reasoning, insofar as they allow someone in Derek Parfit’s imagined scenario to rationally form the intentions characteristic of Future Tuesday Indifference ð104Þ.
REASONING
Broome aims to characterize only the “core type” of reasoning, which he identifies as both active and conscious ð222Þ. Such reasoning is “a rule-governed
operation on the contents of your conscious attitudes” ð234Þ. Broome is “inclined
to think” that these attitudes, which can include at least beliefs and intentions,
must be made explicit in language ð255Þ. So modus ponens reasoning, for example,
would involve expressing one’s beliefs that p and that if p then q to oneself and
then following the modus ponens rule to derive the conclusion q. For you to count
as following a rule, the process must “seem right” to you; this seeming, however,
need not be a phenomenal state ðit may instead involve the absence of phenomenal statesÞ and must involve openness to the possibility of the process ceasing to
seem right ð238Þ. This characterization of reasoning allows for both correct and
incorrect reasoning. What distinguishes correct from incorrect reasoning are the
rational prohibitions and permissions on the basing relation, mentioned above.
Rationality permits you to base a belief that q on the beliefs that p and if p then q,
which makes this a correct pattern of reasoning. On the other hand, rationality
prohibits you from basing a belief that q on the beliefs that p and if q then p, which
makes this an incorrect pattern of reasoning.
Instances of this “core type” of reasoning appear to be quite rare; this is
especially striking since Broome is agnostic as to whether there is any type of reasoning other than the core type. We typically form beliefs and intentions without
being conscious of all our premises, much less making them explicit in language.
Indeed, Broome notes that when our attention settles on one of his synchronic
requirements of theoretical rationality that we do not satisfy, we generally come
to satisfy it so quickly that no reasoning is involved; accordingly, he illustrates
reasoning with an unusual example where “you have just woken up and are gathering your wits” and so you do need to make your premises explicit ð216Þ. It would
be a significant strike against an account of reasoning if it ultimately characterized theoretical reasoning as something done only in the most tedious instances of belief formation.
Broome may be inclined to draw the core type of reasoning narrowly so as to
ensure that it is genuinely something “we do,” as opposed to a mere automatic
process that occurs within us ð208Þ. He cites in particular “a process’s seeming
right to you” as a “sort of personal endorsement from you,” which thereby helps
to make the process “something you do” ð238Þ. But it is not clear that his characterization of the core type succeeds in drawing the desired distinction. We might
be conscious of the operation of an automatic process, even of one that operates on contents we have made explicit in language ðconsider the way one’s mind
may automatically supply the next line of a song or poemÞ. And a phenomenal
or nonphenomenal seeming need not constitute an agent’s endorsement of its
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point of view ðconsider the phenomenal seemings that attend walking over a
glass bridge at a significant height, even when one knows the bridge to be safeÞ.
PUTTING IT TOGETHER
With these materials, Broome is in a position to offer an answer to the “motivation question.” Consider a case in which one believes one ought ðin the central
senseÞ to F but does not intend to F. Related to the requirement of Enkrasia,
there is a general rational permission for a belief that one ought to F to serve as the
basis for an intention to F. In accord with this permission, one may apply a corresponding rule to one’s belief that one ought to F and thereby derive an intention to F. In doing so, one reasons; indeed, one reasons correctly. Because reasoning is something we do, in reasoning to this intention, “we motivate ourselves”
ð294Þ. And by bringing ourselves into conformity with the rational requirement
of Enkrasia, we achieve rationality through reasoning.
It is useful to have an account of how we might achieve rationality through
reasoning. And it may be that Broome’s materials can help us go further. As
Broome notes, in a case of enkratic reasoning, we may end up with an intention
that we have no reason to have, apart from whatever reason there was to be rational ð198Þ. So we might raise the more general question of how reasoning enables us to respond to reasons. In answering this question, we might use the idea
of evidence ðwhich Broome appeals to in various placesÞ and basing permissions
that govern correct reasoning from evidence to beliefs and intentions. This might
help explain how we achieve, not just rationality but also reason responsiveness,
through reasoning.
Aaron Bronfman
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Buchanan, Allen. The Heart of Human Rights.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 336. $45.00 ðclothÞ.
In The Heart of Human Rights, Allen Buchanan offers a comprehensive theory and
justification of international human rights. Although he contends that a justifiable theory of human rights must be morally grounded, he endeavors to provide
such grounding without linking human rights to corresponding moral rights, as
other more philosophical accounts of human rights have attempted ðsee, e.g.,
Joseph Raz, “Human Rights without Foundations,” in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. Samatha Besson and John Tasioulas ½New York: Oxford University
Press, 2010, 321–37; James Griffin, On Human Rights ½New York: Oxford University Press, 2009Þ.
The book is composed of multiple projects, including a thorough defense
of international human rights policy. Buchanan characterizes and defends the
aim of human rights as follows: “To provide universal standards, in the form of
international law, for regulating the behavior of states toward individuals under
their jurisdiction, considered as social beings, for the sake of those individuals
themselves” ð249Þ. Buchanan carefully lays out the sort of strategy needed to jus-

